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Abstract: This paper studies the effects of demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil 
market on several measures of countries’ external balance, including the oil trade balance, the 
non-oil trade balance, the current account and changes in net foreign assets (NFA) during 1975–
2004. We explicitly take a multilateral and global perspective. In addition to the United States, 
the Euro area and Japan, we consider a number of regional aggregates including oil-exporting 
economies and middle-income oil-importing economies. Our first result is that the effect of oil 
shocks on the merchandise trade balance and the current account, which depending on the source 
of the shock can be large, depends critically on the response of the non-oil trade balance, and 
differs systematically between the United States and other oil importing countries. Second, using 
the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti NFA data set, we document the presence of large and systematic (if not 
always statistically significant) valuation effects in response to oil shocks, not only for the 
United States, but also for other oil-importing economies and for oil exporters. Our estimates 
suggest that increased international financial integration will tend to cushion the effect of oil 
shocks on NFA positions for major oil exporters and for the United States, but may amplify it for 
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1. Introduction 
A large literature has investigated the macroeconomic impact of oil-price shocks, focusing in 
particular on the response of real economic growth and consumer price inflation in oil-importing 
countries (see Barsky and Kilian (2004) and Hamilton (2005) for recent reviews). A much 
smaller literature including, for example, Bruno and Sachs (1982), Ostry and Reinhart (1992), 
and Gavin (1990, 1992) has studied the impact of oil price shocks on external accounts.  
This relative neglect of the external channels of the transmission of oil price shocks does 
not reflect a lack of interest in this question. On the one hand, a common premise in policy 
discussions is that oil price shocks have large and often harmful effects on external accounts, 
forcing countries to borrow from abroad to offset adverse terms-of-trade shocks. On the other 
hand, it is sometimes suggested that there is not enough international risk sharing. In that view, 
the ensuing imbalances may not be large enough to cushion the domestic impact of oil price 
shocks effectively. Thus, it is interesting from both a policy and a theoretical point of view to 
investigate and to quantify the impact of oil price shocks on external balances. 
Recent developments in the crude oil market and the emergence of large global external 
imbalances have reignited the long-standing policy discussion about the role of oil prices in 
determining external balances (see, e.g., Rebucci and Spatafora 2006). There is renewed interest 
in the question of how so-called petrodollars will be recycled in the global economy, along with 
the recognition that the impact of disturbances in the crude oil market on oil-importing 
economies depends in part on how increased oil-export revenues are recycled through 
international trade in goods and assets. 
Our paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of the effects of oil price shocks on 
external balances to date. Drawing on new data sets and on methodologies that until recently 
were not available, we document the dynamic effects of demand and supply shocks in the crude 
oil market on external balances during 1975–2004. The paper also examines the changing 
importance of these shocks over time by means of historical decompositions.  
Our analysis departs from the existing literature in several dimensions. First, one of the 
shortcomings of earlier studies has been the very short time span of data available. Our analysis 
covers a far longer time span and more oil price shock episodes than previous studies.  
Second, previous studies of oil shocks tended to focus exclusively on the trade balance    2
and the current account. In this paper we further differentiate between the effects of oil shocks on 
the oil-trade balance and the non-oil trade balance, highlighting the role of the non-oil trade 
balance in offsetting oil trade deficits. We also consider the effects of oil shocks on the valuation 
of net foreign assets (NFA). Valuation effects in the form of capital gains and losses have been 
documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and Gourinchas and Rey (2006) for the United 
States and other countries. We address the complementary question of whether there are 
systematic valuation effects in response to oil shocks that help financially integrated economies 
cope with oil trade deficits. 
Third, previous studies did not analyze the impact of oil price shocks from a multilateral 
perspective, but focused on selected oil-importing industrialized economies. While that focus 
was appropriate in the context of these earlier studies, it leaves many questions unanswered. For 
example, how do external balances in Japan and Europe respond to such shocks compared to the 
United States? How do oil exporters respond to higher oil prices?  How do middle-income 
economies in Latin America and East Asia respond to oil price fluctuations? In order to answer 
these questions our paper explicitly takes a global perspective. In addition to the economies of 
Japan and of the United States, we consider several regional aggregates including oil-importing 
middle-income economies, OPEC members and a broader aggregate of oil-exporting economies. 
This level of disaggregation allows us for the first time to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the international transmission of oil price shocks, while also shedding light on the question of 
how different types of economies and different regions of the world are affected by oil price 
shocks. 
Fourth, our study avoids some of the methodological drawbacks of earlier studies by 
exploiting recent advances in the measurement of shocks in the oil market (see Kilian 2006c). 
We not only control for reverse causality from global macroeconomic aggregates to the price of 
oil, but we also differentiate between different sources of variation in the price of oil. Our 
analysis illustrates the importance of distinguishing between oil price changes driven by crude 
oil supply shocks, by changes in the precautionary demand for crude oil and by innovations to 
the global demand for industrial commodities. 
The main results of the analysis are as follows. First, the overall effect of oil shocks on  
the trade balance, which depending on the source of the shock may be large, depends critically 
on the response of the non-oil trade balance, and differs systematically between the United States   3
and other oil importing countries.  In contrast, the responses of middle-income oil-importing 
economies do not differ systematically from those of the Euro area or Japan.  
Second, using the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) NFA data set, we document the 
presence of valuation effects in response to oil shocks, not only for the United States, but also for 
other oil-importing economies and for oil exporters. While in some cases large and systematic, 
the estimated valuation effects for oil-importing countries are in general difficult to interpret 
without a fully articulated economic model, since they depend on the cross-ownership of assets 
among oil-importing economies and on the relative responses of oil-importing countries’ 
currencies and asset prices. Our analysis suggests that capital gains and losses play an important 
role for net foreign asset dynamics, in particular in response to oil demand shocks, making it 
necessary to consider the degree of financial integration of a country in predicting the effect of 
such a shock. Our estimates suggest that increased international financial integration will tend to 
cushion the effect of oil shocks on NFA positions for major oil exporters and for the United 
States, but may amplify it for other oil importers.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the mechanisms 
by which oil price fluctuations are expected to drive external balances. We emphasize the limited 
applicability of frameworks in which oil price shocks are assumed exogenous. Section 3 
describes the econometric methodology used in this study. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 
reports the estimation results. Section 6 summarizes our main findings and outlines some policy 
conclusions. 
2. Theoretical Background 
A number of theoretical studies have examined the impact of oil price shocks on external 
accounts, holding everything else constant.
1 It is common to focus on one of two limiting cases: 
financial autarky or perfect capital mobility.
2 Under financial autarky, by definition, external 
current-account imbalances cannot emerge in response to oil price shocks. Under perfect capital 
mobility, in contrast, the intertemporal approach to the current account, suggests that a temporary 
                                                 
1 Sen (1994) provides an overview of various channels of transmission. Rebucci and Spatafora (2006) discuss the 
global transmission of oil-price shocks to macroeconomic and financial variables. Bodenstein, Erceg, Guerrieri 
(2006) is a recent example of a DSGE model of the effect of oil price shocks on external accounts. 
2 Perfect capital mobility is consistent with financial market incompleteness in the Arrow-Debreu sense, as typically 
assumed in this literature, because only one financial instrument is traded internationally. Under financial market 
completeness, external balances that arise in response to oil price shocks have no implications for real allocations.   4
oil-price shock should be met with no internal adjustment and a purely transitory flow 
imbalance. Conversely, if the shock is permanent, it should be met with full internal adjustment. 
Such adjustment, however, may prove costly, especially if undertaken quickly. Thus, to the 
extent that agents delay or smooth the internal adjustment process, external imbalances may arise 
even when oil price increases are permanent. 
  Once set in motion, the adjustment process may work through several channels. For our 
purposes, it is useful to distinguish the traditional channels of external adjustment labeled the 
“trade” (or macroeconomic) channel, and the “financial” (or valuation) channel of adjustment.
3 
The trade channel works through changes in the quantities and prices of goods exported and 
imported; the financial channel instead works through changes in external portfolio positions and 
asset prices. 
  Focusing first on the trade channel, an oil-price increase (all else equal) lowers real 
income in oil importing economies, as the terms of trade deteriorate. As real income falls in oil 
importing countries, firms and households will curtail their expenditures and investment plans. 
Oil importers’ currencies will depreciate, while oil exporters’ currencies will appreciate in 
response to their real income gains. Real output falls at least temporarily in the oil-importing 
economy.  Over time, the initial oil trade deficit will decrease, and the non-oil trade balance 
increase. Policy responses may further cushion or amplify these effects.  
  The workings of the financial channel in response to an oil-price increase are more 
nuanced. The financial channel could either cushion or exacerbate the effect of oil price 
increases on oil-importing countries’ external balances. A decrease in asset prices and dividends 
in oil-importing countries in response to an oil price increase will affect all asset owners, 
including residents of oil exporting countries. Conversely, asset prices in oil exporting countries 
will increase, again affecting all asset owners, including residents of oil importing countries. As 
a result, capital gains and income flows may blunt the impact of oil-price changes on the current 
account and on NFA changes. Bond and equity prices and exchange rates typically respond 
much faster than the prices and quantities of goods (and faster than portfolio positions). In 
practice, the response will depend on the precise configuration of countries’ portfolios, and the 
extent to which these portfolios can be rebalanced effectively. With certain portfolio 
                                                 
3 Gourinchas and Rey (2006) analyze the empirical relevance of trade versus financial channels for the United 
States. Ghironi, Lee, and Rebucci (2006) discuss the theoretical workings of the financial channel.   5
configurations, the financial consequences of the shock could even completely offset the need for 
short-term external adjustment. A case in point are the United States, which have mostly fixed 
income liabilities denominated in own currency, while equity and foreign direct investment 
holdings are denominated in foreign currency. In other cases, the financial consequences of the 
shock might require additional external adjustment through the macroeconomic channel. An 
example are oil importing emerging economies which have mostly fixed income liabilities in 
foreign currency and much smaller foreign asset positions. In the long run, however, country 
portfolios will adjust, and the financial channel becomes less important.  
  While this set of results provides a useful framework for thinking about the effects of an 
exogenous shift in oil prices, they may be of limited use in practice because (1) they do not allow 
for endogenous responses of the real price of oil to the global economy, and because (2) they do 
not distinguish between demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market.  
More specifically, theoretical models of the effect of oil price shocks on the economy in 
general (and on external accounts in particular) have typically been constructed under the 
premise that one can think of varying the price of crude oil, while holding all other variables in 
the model constant. In other words, oil prices are treated as exogenous with respect to the global 
economy (see, e.g., Bodenstein et al. 2006). This premise is not credible (see, e.g., Barsky and 
Kilian 2002, 2004; Hamilton 2003). There are both good theoretical reasons and strong empirical 
evidence that global macroeconomic fluctuations influence the price of crude oil (see Kilian 
2006a, 2006c). For example, it is widely accepted that a global business cycle expansion (as in 
recent years) tends to raise the price of oil.
4 The fact that the same economic shocks that drive 
macroeconomic aggregates (and thus external accounts) also may drive the price of crude oil 
makes it impossible to separate cause and effect in studying the effect of higher oil prices on 
external accounts without a structural model of oil prices. This means that the question of how 
external accounts respond to an increase in the price of oil is not well defined.  
  Moreover, even if we were to control for reverse causality, existing theoretical models 
postulate that the effect of an exogenous increase in the price of oil is the same, regardless of 
which shocks in the oil market are responsible for driving up the price of crude oil. Recent work 
by Kilian (2006c) has shown that the effects of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil 
                                                 
4 As noted by Hamilton (2005), “it is clear … that demand increases rather than supply reductions have been the 
primary factor driving oil prices over the last several years.”   6
market on U.S. macroeconomic aggregates are qualitatively and quantitatively different, 
depending on whether the oil price increase is driven by a booming world economy (resulting in 
high demand for all industrial commodities including crude oil), by a disruption of global crude 
oil production, or by shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil that reflect increased concerns 
about the availability of future oil supplies. It is quite natural to expect similar differences in the 
effect of these shocks on external accounts. In addition, oil price shocks historically have been 
driven by varying combinations of oil demand and oil supply shocks, so their effect on external 
aggregates is bound to be different from one episode to the next. In the next section, we outline 
an empirical methodology that addresses both of these concerns and enables us to shed new light 
on the transmission of oil price shocks.  
3. Empirical Methodology 
Our empirical approach involves two main steps. The first step is to trace fluctuations in the real 
price of crude oil to the underlying demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. The 
second step is to assess empirically the responses of external accounts of selected countries and 
country groups to the demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market identified in the first 
step. To the extent that the latter shocks are predetermined with respect to macroeconomic 
aggregates and external accounts, standard regression methods can be used to estimate the 
responses of external accounts by country or region and to determine the extent to which 
historical fluctuations in external accounts were driven by the cumulative effect of specific 
demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. 
 
A. Construction of the Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market 
Our approach closely follows the identification strategy of Kilian (2006c). We estimate a 
structural VAR model based on monthly data for the vector time series  t z , consisting of the 
percent change in global crude oil production, a measure of global real economic activity in 
industrial commodity markets, and the real price of crude oil.
5 Given the possibility that some 
                                                 
5 The term real economic activity in this paper is understood to refer to real economic activity that affects industrial 
commodity markets rather than the usual broader concept of real economic activity underlying world real GDP or 
industrial output  This distinction is necessary because an increase in value added in the service sector, for example, 
is likely to have a very different effect on global demand for industrial commodities than an increase in 
manufacturing. The index of global real economic activity in industrial commodity markets is constructed from 
representative single voyage freight rates collected by Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd. for various bulk dry   7
responses may be delayed by more than a year, the VAR model allows for two years’ worth of 
lags. The structural VAR representation of the model is 
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where  t ε  denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. The 
structural innovations are derived by imposing exclusion restrictions on 
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attribute fluctuations in the real price of oil to three structural shocks:  1t ε denotes shocks to the 
global supply of crude oil (henceforth “oil supply shock”);  2t ε  captures shocks to the global 
demand for industrial commodities (including crude oil) that are driven by global real economic 
activity (“aggregate demand shock”); and  3t ε  denotes an oil-market specific demand shock. The 
latter shock is designed to capture shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil that reflect 
increased concerns about the availability of future oil supplies that are by construction 
orthogonal to the other shocks (“oil-specific demand shock”).
6   
 Following Kilian (2006c), we assume that (1) crude oil production will not respond to oil 
demand shocks within the month, given the costs of adjusting oil production and the uncertainty 
about the state of the crude oil market; (2) that increases in the real price of oil driven by demand 
shocks that are specific to the oil market will not lower global real economic activity in industrial 
commodity markets within the month; and (3) that innovations to the real price of oil that cannot 
be explained by oil supply shocks or aggregate demand shocks must be demand shocks that are 
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cargoes such as coal, iron ore, fertilizer, and scrap metal. For a full discussion of the rationale and construction of 
this index see Kilian (2006c). 
6 While it is beyond reasonable doubt that oil-market specific demand shocks near certain dates in the sample (such 
as the year 1979 or the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War in 1990) reflect shifts in precautionary demand, in general, 
oil-market specific demand shocks may also reflect other factors that are orthogonal to oil supply shocks and 
aggregate demand shocks such as exogenous changes in crude oil inventory policies.  Kilian (2006c) shows, 
however, that inventories seem to have changed in response to changing oil prices rather than the other way around. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to interpret oil-market specific demand shocks as shifts in precautionary demand for oil 
driven by fears about the availability of future oil supplies.   8
The response of the real price of oil to the three structural shocks  ,1 , 2 , 3 , jt j ε =  is 
reported in Figure 1. There are striking differences depending on the source of the shock. An 
unanticipated increase in oil-market specific demand (such as an increase in precautionary 
demand for oil) causes an immediate and persistent increase in the real price of oil; an 
unanticipated increase in aggregate demand for all industrial commodities causes a delayed, but 
sustained increase in the real price of oil; and an unanticipated oil supply disruption causes a 
transitory increase in the real price of oil within the first year. 
Using the fitted values of model (1) we can decompose the fluctuations in the real price 
of oil at each point in time into components representing the cumulative effect of all shocks of a 
given type up to this date (see Figure 2). The historical decomposition in Figure 2 suggests that 
major oil price surges typically have been driven by a combination of aggregate demand shocks 
and precautionary demand shocks, rather than oil supply shocks. For example, the increase in the 
real price of oil after 2003 was driven entirely by the cumulative effects of positive global 
demand shocks. 
  In this paper, we are interested in assessing the effect of these crude oil demand and 
crude oil supply shocks on external imbalances. Whereas the shocks implied by the VAR model 
are measured at monthly frequency, international data on external accounts for most countries 
are available only at annual frequency. Following a similar procedure in Kilian (2006c), we deal 
with this problem by constructing measures of the annual shocks as averages of the monthly 
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where  ,, ˆjti ε refers to the estimated residual for the jth structural shock in the ith month of the tth 
year of the sample. Although data for  t z  are available as far back as 1973, we lose two years 
worth of observations in estimating the VAR model. Thus, the resulting annual shock series 
extends back only as far as 1975.  Figure 3 plots  ˆ ,1 , 2 , 3 . jt j ζ = The pattern of shocks in the late 
1970s and in the 1980s in particular is consistent with additional evidence about the genesis of 
the second oil crisis presented in Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004). 
   9
B. Estimation of the Dynamic Effects 
Let  t y  denote a stationary macroeconomic aggregate of interest such as the share of the trade 
balance in GDP. We are interested in estimating the response of  t y  to demand and supply shocks 
in the crude oil market. We treat the shocks  ˆ
jt ζ ,  1,...,3, j =  as predetermined with respect to  t y . 
Predeterminedness rules out feedback from  t y  to the shocks  ˆ
jt ζ , 1,...,3, j =  within a given year 
. t
7 This assumption allows us to examine their dynamic effects on the dependent variable based 
on regressions of the form: 
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where  t u  is a potentially serially correlated error, and  ˆ
jt ζ  is a serially uncorrelated shock. The 
parameter h is chosen to coincide with the maximum horizon of the impulse response function 
to be computed. By definition the impulse response is  1, ˆ
tj t dy dζ + . Differentiation yields that 
, ˆ
tj t i i dy dζ ψ − = . Under stationarity, it follows that  ,, ˆˆ . tj t it ij t i dy d dy d ζζ ψ −+ ==   
   Regression model (2) allows consistent estimation of the impulse responses under minimal 
assumptions. In practice, we set the maximum horizon of the impulse responses to five years. 
Our equation-by-equation approach is built on the premise that the shock series  ˆ
jt ζ , 1,...,3, j =  
are mutually uncorrelated.  Whereas the structural VAR residuals  ˆjt ε , 1,...,3, j =  are orthogonal 
by construction, the annual shocks  ˆ
jt ζ , 1,...,3, j =  which have been obtained by aggregating 
over time, need not be orthogonal. Table 1 shows that their contemporaneous correlation ranges 
between -2 and 11 percent. Although inevitably there will be some omitted variable bias, these 
correlations are so low that not much is lost by treating the shocks as orthogonal and estimating a 
separate equation for each shock. 
  We also investigated some alternative regression approaches. One alternative approach 
would have been to estimate model (2) including current and lagged values of all shocks. Given 
the very short sample of external balances available and given the need to include five lags for 
                                                 
7 In contrast, strict exogeneity imposes in addition Granger non-causality from  t y  to ˆ
jt ζ . For further discussion see 
Cooley and LeRoy (1985). Pre-determinedness and strict exogeneity in our regression framework correspond to the 
notion of weak and strong exogeneity, respectively, in the parlance of Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983).   10
each shock, that approach is not practically feasible. Yet another approach would have been to fit 
a recursively identified VAR model to () 123 ˆˆˆ
ttt t y ζζζ ′ with a sufficiently high lag order. That 
more restrictive regression approach is practically feasible, but many of the response estimates 
are strongly counterintuitive and the estimation results are highly sensitive to the lag structure, 
suggesting that the model structure is rejected by the data or – more likely – that there is a 
serious overfitting problem. A third alternative would have been to add lagged dependent 
variables as regressors in the model (2). The latter specification would have required strict 
exogeneity of  ˆ
jt ζ  with respect to  t y , which is not a viable assumption in our context (see Kilian 
2006a,b,c). For these reasons, we report results based on the parsimonious equation-by-equation 
approach based on model (2). 
4. Data 
In the empirical analysis we consider seven different measures of external balance. The specific 
measures of external balance used are: 
•  Change in Net Foreign Assets ≡ Current Account + Capital Gains 
•  Current Account ≡ Merchandise Trade Balance + Service Trade Balance + Income 
Balance 
•  Merchandise Trade Balance ≡ Oil Trade Balance + Non-Oil Merchandise Trade 
Balance 
•  Oil Trade Balance 
•  Non-Oil Merchandise Trade Balance 
•  Capital Gains on Gross Foreign Assets and Liabilities. 
 
In what follows, the trade balance should be understood to refer to the merchandise trade 
balance. The trade balance does not include trade in services because of data availability and 
concerns about the poor quality of trade data on services. We also exclude the income balance 
which is usually computed as the difference between the current account and trade balance. The 
reason is that the income balance is difficult to interpret without further knowledge of the asset 
position of a country, and that it cannot be measured accurately. For example, the income 
balance cannot be separated from transfer payments, even when data on trade in services are 
available. A more detailed description of these aggregates is provided in the Data Appendix. The 
NFA data are from Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006). All other data (including the trade balance,    11
current account, and GDP data) are from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.  
Our analysis focuses on the following countries and country groupings: 
 
1. Oil exporters 
Major oil exporters  
 OPEC 
Canada and UK 
 
2. High-income oil-importing economies 
United States 
Euro Area  
Japan 
 
3. Middle-income oil-importing economies 
Middle-income economies 
Latin America  
Emerging Asia  
 
A list of the countries included in each group is provided in the Appendix. All external 
accounts are expressed in current dollars. As is conventional, all external accounts are 
normalized by nominal GDP for the empirical analysis. Shares in GDP for the groups are not 
computed by averaging shares across countries, but by adding external accounts across countries 
and normalizing them by the sum of GDP in current dollars of the same countries. This 
procedure has the advantage of netting out intra-group imbalances.  
A country is classified as a major oil exporter if its average share of fuel exports in total 
exports over the sample period (1970-2005) is at least 20 percent.
8 OPEC is a subset of the set of 
major oil exporters. In addition, we treat Canada and the U.K. as a separate group because these 
countries are likely to behave differently from both oil-importing advanced economies and from 
major oil exporters. Both countries have diversified export structures with fuel shares of less than 
20 percent, but their oil exports are large in absolute value during the sample period. In contrast, 
the oil export share of Norway is high enough for the country to qualify as a major oil exporter. 
  Middle-income economies are classified as developing countries that lie above the 
median of the PPP-weighted GDP per capita of the sample of all developing economies 
excluding China and India. We do not report results for low-income countries given the poor 
quality of these countries’ external accounts data. We also exclude China and India. The Chinese 
                                                 
8 Fuel exports include petroleum products, natural gas and coal. The list of OPEC countries excludes Iraq because of 
NFA data availability.   12
economy underwent major structural changes during the sample period, making it difficult to 
interpret the responses. We do not include results for India, because India, given its size and 
position in the income distribution, is not representative of either low or middle income 
economies. The United States, Japan, and the Euro Area are examined individually. 
5. Results 
We estimate regression model (2) for each of the 54 dependent variables defined in section 4.  
Regression model (2) treats the oil shocks  ˆ
jt ζ , 1,...,3, j = as predetermined with respect to the 
dependent variable. The realism of this assumption may be judged by focusing on the example of 
the United States. Clearly, the United States is the economy for which this assumption is most 
likely to be invalid, given the overall size of the U.S. economy and its disproportionate 
contribution to the world economy. As Table 2 shows, nevertheless, innovations to the U.S. 
dependent variables are not very highly correlated with demand and supply shocks in the crude 
oil market at the annual frequency, with the exception of the oil trade balance, which is highly 
negatively correlated with oil-specific demand shocks for the obvious reason that oil-specific 
demand shocks raise the price of oil immediately causing the oil trade balance to deteriorate on 
impact (see Figure 1). These low correlations are important because they dispel concerns that 
positive innovations to domestic real economic activity (reflected in a deterioration of the current 
account as a share of GDP) may drive aggregate demand innovations in global commodity 
markets or innovations to the supply of crude oil. If there were such causal link within the year, 
one would expect to see a large, positive correlation in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. 
 
5.1. Impulse responses 
Figures 4-12 show the estimated impulse responses of each measure of external balance by type 
of shock. All responses have been normalized such that a given shock will imply an increase in 
the real price of oil. The results shown are expressed as a share of GDP. The one-standard error 
and two-standard error bands for the impulse responses based on model (2) are constructed using 
a block bootstrap method that allows for serially correlated error terms (see Berkowitz, Birgean 
and Kilian 1999). 
 
5.1.1. Oil exporters 
We begin the analysis with the oil exporters. The natural starting point in analyzing the effects of    13
demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market is the oil trade balance. We would expect 
negative supply shocks or positive demand shocks in the crude oil market to improve the oil 
trade balance of oil exporters, to the extent that such shocks increase the price of oil. Indeed, the 
point estimates in column 1 of Figure 4 indicate that oil exporters’ oil trade balances persistently 
improve in response to such shocks, although that increase is not always statistically significant. 
Much stronger and more significant responses are obtained for the subset of OPEC countries in 
Figure 5. The temporary nature of the response is consistent with the view that the quantity of oil 
exports falls over time, as demand for crude oil falls. For Canada and the U.K., the responses in 
Figure 6 are not only much smaller (consistent with the lesser importance of crude oil exports for 
those countries), but largely statistically insignificant with the exception of the response to an oil 
supply disruption.  
We find evidence of a deterioration of oil exporters’ non-oil trade balance in response to 
favorable shocks in the crude oil market from the oil exporters’ point of view (in column 2), 
consistent with the view that an increase in oil prices and hence wealth is associated with 
increased demand for (and reduced supply of) non-oil tradable goods. The magnitude and timing 
of this response, however, differs depending on the type of shock, reflecting their uneven impact 
on the real price of oil (see Figure 1). For oil exporters in general (and OPEC countries in 
particular) demand shocks result in a significant deterioration of the non-oil trade balance in the 
medium run, whereas the response to oil supply disruptions is largely insignificant (see Figures 4 
and 5). In contrast, the responses of the non-oil trade balance of Canada and the U.K. in Figure 6 
resemble more the responses of advanced oil-importing economies (see section 5.1.2).  Overall, 
shocks in the crude oil market that raise the real price of oil tend to improve the trade balance of 
oil exporters  (in column 3) and their current account (in column 4), although the responses are 
not always significant. 
  As discussed in section 2, the trade effects of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil 
market may be cushioned not only by the non-oil trade balance, but also by capital gains. 
Although capital gains may be inferred from comparing the responses of the current account and 
of changes in NFA, we compute separate responses for capital gains.
9 This facilitates the 
construction of confidence intervals for the response of capital gains. Column 5 of Figures 4 and 
                                                 
9 NFA data for oil exporters may not capture all capital gains. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) for a discussion 
of the NFA data of these countries.   14
5 suggests that oil-supply disruptions cause a significant capital loss in oil-exporting economies, 
whereas the responses induced by demand shocks tend to be statistically insignificant. In the case 
of an oil supply shock, the capital loss offsets the improvement in the current account and 
renders the change-in-NFA response statistically insignificant (see last column). This result is 
consistent with the view that foreign-denominated assets held by oil exporters depreciate as a 
result of oil-supply disruptions. In the case of oil-specific demand increase, the same explanation 
applies, but the capital gain responses are estimated less precisely. Given the small magnitude of 
the capital losses, there is an accumulation of NFA, but the response is smaller than it otherwise 
would be. Capital losses in response to oil supply disruptions play a much less important role for 
Canada and the U.K. in Figure 6. 
 
5.1.2. High-Income Oil-Importing Economies 
Figures 7–9 focus on advanced oil-importing economies, namely the United States, Japan, and 
the Euro area. 
Oil trade balance 
As expected, all types of oil shocks impact the oil-trade balance of advanced oil-importing 
economies negatively and often persistently; yet there are some important differences across 
shocks. An oil-specific demand increase (such as an increase in precautionary demand for crude 
oil) causes an immediate, persistent and highly significant oil trade deficit (see column 1), 
consistent with the response of the price of oil in Figure 1. As a share of GDP this effect is 
relatively small for the United States, but much more pronounced for other advanced economies 
such as Japan or the Euro area. This result is expected given the higher dependence on imported 
oil in the Euro area and in Japan. A positive aggregate demand shock in global commodity 
markets also causes an oil trade deficit, but with a delay, consistent with the delayed response of 
the price of oil to such shocks. The response remains significant after three to four years. Again 
the U.S. response is smaller than the estimates for other advanced economies. An oil supply 
disruption is associated with a negative response of the oil trade balance in all advanced 
economies, but that effect is less long-lasting and less precisely estimated. The larger and more 
statistically significant estimated responses to oil demand shocks are consistent with the 
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Non-oil trade balance 
Figures 7–9 show that the non-oil trade balance tends to improve in response to oil shocks that  
raise the price of oil, although some responses are estimated imprecisely (see column 2).  
Nevertheless, there are important differences depending on whether the shock is to demand or to 
supply, as well as across countries. For example, whereas for the Euro area there is some 
evidence of a significant non-oil trade surplus in response to an adverse oil supply shock, the 
corresponding responses for the U.S. and for Japan are statistically insignificant. This result is 
consistent with evidence that oil exporters’ propensity to spend oil revenues is skewed toward 
European goods (see Rebucci and Spatafora 2006).  
  In contrast, for the U.S., but not for other advanced oil-importing economies, an 
unanticipated increase in aggregate demand is associated with a delayed, but significant surplus 
in non-oil trade. Finally, in both the U.S. and Japan, and to a lesser extent in the Euro area, the 
non-oil trade balance increases significantly in response to oil-specific demand shocks, although 
typically the response involves some delay. This delay is consistent with a slow downward 
adjustment of expenditures in oil-importing economies as well as a slow upward adjustment of 
expenditures in oil-exporting economies in response to the sharp increase in oil prices triggered 




Overall, the previous findings suggest that adverse shocks in the crude oil market tend to worsen  
the oil trade balance of advanced-economy oil importers, but that the non-oil trade balance often 
improves in response. Column 3 of Figures 7–9 illustrates that the net effect on the trade balance 
differs across countries. For example, a positive aggregate demand shock causes an initial trade 
deficit in the United States, followed by a significant trade surplus after three years. There also is 
some evidence of a surplus in response to increases in oil-specific demand. In all other advanced 
economies, oil-specific demand increases cause an immediate, persistent and highly statistically 
significant trade deficit, whereas aggregate demand expansions cause a temporary trade deficit 
with a delay of about two years. These results confirm that there are systematic differences 
between the United States and other economies. 
 
                                                 
10 The estimated responses for the U.S. non-oil trade balance are consistent with estimates of the effect of the same 
oil shocks on U.S. real GDP reported in Kilian (2006c). As the price of oil rises and real GDP falls, the non-oil trade 
balance moves into surplus.    16
Capital gains 
International financial integration (as measured by the size of gross foreign asset positions) may  
affect the transmission of oil shocks to the extent that it creates the potential for valuation effects, 
which can magnify or (at least partially) offset movements in the current account.  Valuation 
effects manifest themselves in capital gains or capital losses. The extent of these gains and losses 
will depend in general on how the ownership of assets is distributed across countries.  They also 
may depend on the extent to which the U.S. dollar depreciates against the currencies of other oil-
importing economies, given the unique structure of the U.S. portfolio.  
Column 6 of Figures 7-9 assesses this channel of transmission. In interpreting these 
results, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of the NFA data set (see Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2006). With that caveat in mind, the data suggest a clear pattern of valuation effects, in 
particular in response to aggregate demand shocks. Specifically, the United States experience 
significant short-run capital gains, followed by equally significant capital losses in years 3 and 
4. The response of capital gains in the Euro area and in Japan is roughly the mirror image of the 
U.S. response. For the United States, for the Euro area and for Japan, there is a small negative, 
but statistically insignificant response of capital gains to oil supply disruptions, consistent with 
these shocks’ small impact on the price of oil (see Figure 1). Finally, a precautionary oil-demand 
increase causes an initial capital loss, followed by a significant capital gain in years 3 and 4. 
While the similarities are not as pronounced as for the aggregate demand shock, the U.S. 
response again is the rough mirror image of the response for the Euro area and for Japan. 
This analysis suggests that valuation effects can be important. For the United States and  
for oil exporting economies, valuation effects tend to dampen the impact of oil shocks. For the 
Euro area and Japan, in contrast, valuation effects in some cases magnify the impact of oil 
shocks. Thus, international financial integration may amplify or cushion the effect of oil shocks, 
depending on the context. 
 
Current account and change in NFA 
As a result of the non-oil trade balance responses and capital gain responses, the impact of 
shocks that raise the price of crude oil on the current account and on the change in NFA may not 
as negative as the textbook explanations would suggest. For example, the U.S. NFA position 
does not change significantly in response to an oil supply shock. It actually improves with some 
delay in response to oil-market specific demand increases. There also is some evidence of a   17
temporary improvement in the U.S. NFA position in response to positive aggregate demand 
shocks, but the corresponding improvement in the current account is preceded by a deficit.  
In contrast, for other advanced oil-importing economies, the same oil shocks tend to 
cause a current account deficit and a reduction in NFA in most cases, although the declines are 
not always statistically significant. This asymmetry in how the same oil shocks affect the United 
States and other advanced oil-importing countries has not been documented previously. 
 
 
5.1.3. Middle-Income Oil-Importing Economies 
Figure 10 highlights the role of the non-oil trade balance in the transmission of oil shocks in 
middle-income economies. Whereas the oil trade balance systematically falls in response to 
shocks that raise the price of oil (the response to oil supply disruptions and oil-specific demand 
increases being highly significant, and that to aggregate demand shocks being marginally 
significant), the non-oil trade balance may improve or deteriorate depending on the shock. The 
response of the non-oil trade balance to an oil supply disruption is negative, although not 
precisely estimated. In contrast, the response to a positive aggregate demand shock is positive 
and statistically significant, and the response to an oil-specific demand shock is not statistically 
different from zero. 
  The effect on the overall trade balance depends on the relative magnitude of the 
responses of the oil- and non-oil trade balance. For example, an aggregate demand shock that 
raises the real price of oil will result in a marginally significant improvement of the trade balance 
on impact, whereas oil supply disruptions and increases in precautionary demand are causing a 
significant deterioration of the overall trade balance. As in the case of advanced oil-importing 
economies, the response of the non-oil trade balance to oil demand shocks partially offsets that 
of the oil-trade balance. 
  Figure 10 also illustrates the importance of valuation effects for middle-income countries. 
There is evidence of a statistically significant capital loss after the second year in response to a 
positive aggregate demand shock and of a significant capital gain in years 3 and 4. The estimated 
response is qualitatively similar to the estimates for the Euro area and for Japan, but more 
statistically significant, and almost exactly the mirror image of the U.S. response. The responses 
of capital gains to the other two oil shocks are largely statistically insignificant. 
  The current account deteriorates significantly in response to oil supply disruptions and in    18
response to an increase in oil-specific demand. In the case of the oil supply disruption, this 
decline is driven mainly by the trade balance; in the case of the oil-specific demand shock it is 
driven by the trade balance and exacerbated by the net effect of income payments, transfers and 
the trade balance in services. In contrast, the current account response to a positive aggregate 
demand shock is significantly positive on impact, but subsequently turns significantly negative, 
reflecting the evolution of the trade balance. 
The net foreign asset position deteriorates in all cases and in some cases significantly so. 
The timing of that decline appears to be driven primarily by the valuation effect, as opposed to 
the current account. Thus, capital gains are a potentially important channel in the transmission of 
oil shocks not only for the United States and other advanced economies, but for middle-income 
economies as well. 
 
5.1.4. Latin America vs. Emerging Asia 
The estimates for the aggregate of middle-income oil-importing economies mask interesting 
contrasts between Latin America and Emerging Asia.
11 This comparison is particularly 
interesting, as Emerging Asia is comprised of economies that are typically more open than Latin 
American economies. Figures 11 and 12 show a negative response of the oil trade balance to all 
three shocks for both groups of countries. The response of the non-oil trade balance to oil supply 
disruptions is more negative on impact in Latin America. The response of the non-oil trade 
balance to oil-demand shocks is less pronounced for Latin America. The decline in the non-oil 
trade balance in year 3 in Emerging Asia is consistent with the decline of U.S. real GDP in 
response to an aggregate demand increase, to which export-oriented East Asian economies are 
more susceptible. Similarly, an oil-specific demand increase causes an immediate reduction in 
U.S. real growth and hence a more significant overall trade deficit for Emerging Asia in Figure 
11 than for Latin America in Figure 12.
12 The response of the overall trade balance reflects this 
pattern. The overall current account deteriorates more in Emerging Asia, owing to the non-oil 
trade balance. One interpretation is that Latin America’s limited access to international capital 
markets has discouraged borrowing in response to oil demand shocks. 
There is little evidence of significant capital gains or losses in response to oil shocks in  
                                                 
11 The aggregates for Latin America and Emerging Asia that we study below have been constructed excluding all oil 
exporters in these regions. 
12 See Kilian (2006c) for further details on the response of U.S. macroeconomic aggregates.   19
Latin America, consistent with Latin America’s currencies depreciating less than the U.S. dollar 
because of limited exchange-rate flexibility during much of our sample period. For Emerging 
Asia there is a marginally significant capital loss after two years, followed by a statistically 
significant and large capital gain after three years in response to positive aggregate demand 
shocks, not unlike the responses found for advanced oil-importing countries. There are no 
significant responses to other shocks. 
 
5.1.5. Summary 
Our analysis allows some generalizations about the typical response of oil importers and oil 
exporters to oil shocks. First, while any shock in the crude oil market that raises the price of 
crude oil will push a typical oil importers’ oil trade balance into deficit, the timing and the 
magnitude of the response of the oil trade balance depends on the source of the shock. A positive 
aggregate demand shock, for example, tends to generate an oil trade deficit with some delay. In 
contrast, shocks to the precautionary demand for oil and shocks to supply tend to cause an 
immediate oil trade deficit, the former being more sustained and larger than the latter. Second, 
these same shocks also tend to be associated with a non-oil trade surplus that partially offsets the 
oil trade deficit, giving rise to an overall trade deficit (with some delay in the case of aggregate 
demand shocks and immediately upon impact for positive precautionary oil demand and negative 
oil supply shocks). Third, the extent to which the resulting trade and current account deficits 
translate into a deterioration of the NFA position depends on the response of capital gains. Oil 
demand shocks may also cause large and systematic (if not always statistically significant) 
valuation effects. Increased international financial integration thus may help cushion the impact 
of future disturbances in global crude oil markets for oil importers whose assets are widely held 
abroad (as in the case of the United States), while potentially amplifying it in other cases. 
  The overall response of the typical oil exporter is the mirror image of the typical oil 
importer. Positive precautionary oil demand shocks and negative oil supply shocks produce an 
immediate oil trade surplus, whereas positive aggregate demand shocks cause an oil trade surplus 
with some delay. The surplus in the oil-trade balance is associated with a non-oil trade deficit. 
On balance, trade and current account balances of oil exporters improve. The NFA increase in 
response to aggregate demand and oil-specific demand shocks is dampened to the extent that oil 
exporters experience capital losses. In response to oil supply disruptions, in particular, capital 
losses tend to render the positive response of NFA changes insignificant.   20
 
5.2. Historical Decompositions 
Impulse responses are estimates of the average effect of a one-time shock on the dependent 
variable. Since more than one oil shock occurs at any given point in time, and since the 
composition of innovations to the real price of oil evolves over time, impulse response estimates 
do not tell us how much of the evolution of the external accounts must be attributed to oil 
shocks. Historical decompositions of the fluctuations in external accounts shed light on the 
cumulative effect of each oil shock on a given external account. They can be constructed by 
simulating the path of the dependent variable from the fitted regression model (2) under the 
counterfactual assumption that a given demand or supply shock in the oil market is zero 
throughout the sample. The difference between this counterfactual path of the dependent variable 
and its actual path is a measure of the cumulative effect of the shock in question. 
  We computed the cumulative effect of all three oil shocks combined as well as the 
cumulative effects by shock. Two results are particularly interesting. First, as Figure 13 shows, 
the model tracks reasonably well major shifts in external accounts such as the rapid NFA 
accumulation by OPEC after 1999 and the growing US current account deficit since the late 
1990s. Second, the relative importance of individual demand and supply shocks may change 
drastically from one episode to the next. Figure 14 focuses on the current accounts of the United 
States and of OPEC. For example, the OPEC current account deficit of 1998 is associated with 
the temporary drop in oil-specific demand following the Asian crisis of 1997, when oil prices 
reached an all-time low in recent history. In contrast, both the current account deficit of 1991/92 
and the current account surplus since 2002 were driven primarily by global aggregate demand 
shocks. Figure 14 also shows that the deterioration of the U.S. current account since 2000 
appears to be driven primarily by global aggregate demand shocks.  
6. Conclusions  
This paper provided a comprehensive analysis of the effects of oil shocks on external balances 
covering a wide range of countries. Our analysis explicitly recognized that oil price changes do 
not take place in isolation, but may be driven by some of the same macroeconomic forces that 
determine external balances, as illustrated by the recent surge in oil prices driven by strong 
global demand for crude oil (see Hamilton 2005). We also distinguished between oil price 
changes driven by crude oil supply shocks, oil price changes driven by shocks to global   21
aggregate demand for industrial commodities, and oil price changes driven by oil-market specific 
demand shocks such as shocks to the precautionary demand for oil. This distinction between 
different types of shocks is crucial. As emphasized in the paper, crude oil-price increases (all else 
equal) will affect external balances of oil importers differently depending on whether they reflect 
increased demand for oil or decreased supply of oil. This result is consistent with evidence that 
these shocks have qualitatively and quantitatively different effects on the real price of oil. 
Our key findings are: (1) Non-oil trade balances play a central role in the international 
transmission of oil shocks. The response of the non-oil trade balance may offset oil trade deficits 
and helps explain striking differences between the response of the United States and that of other 
oil-importing economies. (2) There also is some evidence of valuation effects of oil shocks with 
capital gains and losses offsetting or amplifying trade imbalances. The importance of valuation 
effects has been documented for the U.S. based on overall changes in balance of payments data 
by Gourinchas and Rey (2006); our results complement this literature by focusing on the 
response of external balances to specific shocks. We find evidence of valuation effects in 
response to oil shocks not only for the U.S., but more generally for other advanced and middle 
income economies and for oil exporters. We showed that valuation effects may either cushion or 
amplify the response of the current account to oil shocks, depending on the context. (3) In 
general, the nature of the transmission of oil price increases is highly dependent on the cause of 
the oil price increase. If the real price of oil increases due to strong global demand for industrial 
commodities, for example, the implied responses of external accounts are quite different from 
the responses to an oil supply disruption or to an increase in precautionary demand for crude oil 
reflecting concerns about future oil supply shortfalls. 
  Our analysis showed that international financial integration plays two distinct roles in the 
transmission of oil shocks. First, it allows risk sharing between oil exporters and oil importers. 
Ownership of oil assets by residents of oil-importing countries provides some insurance against 
oil price increases and helps diversify the risks associated with oil shocks. In turn, ownership of 
foreign assets by oil producers provides some insurance against falling oil prices for oil-
exporting economies. Second, international financial integration affects how the burden of 
adjustment is distributed among oil-importing economies. The United States in particular was 
shown to be in a unique and privileged position in that its NFA position may improve in 
response to oil shocks, when other oil-importing economies may potentially experience NFA    22
losses in response to the same shocks. 
  Our results have important implications for the economic modeling of oil price shocks in 
macroeconomic models of external accounts. First, our results illustrate the importance of 
controlling for reverse causality and of distinguishing between oil price changes driven by 
different types of shocks. Second, they highlight the importance of incorporating trade in assets 
in theoretical models of oil price shocks. Our findings suggest that theoretical models that ignore 
this channel of transmission will not be consistent with the data. This conclusion is in sharp 
contrast to the current generation of dynamic general equilibrium models of external accounts 
that treat oil prices as exogenous. 
  Our analysis also has implications for the recent policy debate about growing external 
imbalances. For example, the widening imbalance in the U.S. current account can be explained 
to a large extent by the cumulative effect of demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. 
In particular, the data suggest that global aggregate demand shocks have played a significant role 
in recent years in the emergence of these imbalances.   23
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Data Appendix 
 
A. Variable List 
Description Calculation  Units/Scale Variable 
name 
Source 
Gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars  Billions of 
US dollars 
gdp  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Net external position  Millions of 
US dollars 
nfa Lane/Milesi-Ferreti 
Net foreign assets as a share of GDP   (nfa /1000) / gdp) * 100  Percent of 
GDP 
nfa_gdp Lane/Milesi-Ferreti,  IMF 
World Economic Outlook 
Current account balance  Billions of 
US dollars 
ca  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Current account balance as a share of GDP  (ca /gdp) * 100  Percent of 
GDP 
ca_gdp  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Trade balance for goods  Billions of 
US dollars 
tb  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Trade balance as a share of GDP  (tb /gdp) * 100  Percent of 
GDP 
tb_gdp  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Oil trade balance  Billions of 
US dollars 
tbo  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Oil trade balance as a share of GDP  (tbo/gdpd) * 100  Percent of 
GDP 
tbo_gdp  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Non-oil trade balance  tb-tbo  Billions of 
US dollars 
tbno  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Non-oil trade balance as a share of GDP    Percent of  
GDP 
tbno_gdp IMF World Economic Outlook 
Change in NFA over the previous year  nfa t - nfa t-1  Millions of 
US dollars 
dnfa Lane/Milesi-Ferreti 
Change in NFA as a share of GDP     ((dnfa/1000) / gdp) * 100 Percent of 
GDP 
dnfa_gdp Lane/Milesi-Ferreti, IMF 
World Economic Outlook 
Capital gains as defined by the difference between the change in NFA and the 
current account balance 
(dnfa/1000) – ca  Billions of 
US dollars 
capgain Lane/Milesi-Ferreti,  IMF 
World Economic Outlook 
Capital gains as a share of GDP defined by the difference between the change in 
NFA and the current account balance divided by GDP 





World Economic Outlook   26
B. Country groupings: 
 
Fuel exporters (26):   Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Congo (Rep. of), Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico,  
   Nigeria,  Norway,  Oman,  Qatar,  Russia,  Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela,  
   Y e m e n .  
 
OPEC (10):    Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela. 
 






Euro Area (12):    Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.    
 
Middle-Income  
Economies (46):  Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Hungary, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Swaziland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yugoslavia. 
 
Emerging Asia (7):  Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand. 
 
Latin America (10):  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. 
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Table 1: Correlations of Demand and Supply Shocks in Crude Oil Market Aggregated to Annual Frequency 
1975-2004 
 






Oil Supply Shock  1  -0.02    0.11 
Aggregate Demand Shock  -  1  -0.08 
Oil-Specific Demand Shock  -  -  1 
 
NOTES: The oil shocks are obtained from model (1) as described in the text. 
 
 
Table 2: Correlations of the Innovations of External Balances (as a Percent Share of GDP) with Oil Shocks 
United States 
 
Share in GDP  Oil Supply  Aggregate Demand  Oil-Specific Demand 
Change in NFA     0.06   -0.08   0.13 
Current Account     0.03   -0.13  -0.19 
Trade Balance   -0.04    0.04  -0.10 
Oil Trade Balance     0.01  -0.31  -0.49 
Non-Oil Trade Balance  -0.15    0.19   0.27 
Income Balance    0.20   -0.05   0.18 
Capital Gain  -0.17    0.15   0.18 
 
 
NOTES: The innovations are estimated as the residuals of AR(2) models for each of the external balance measures. The oil shocks are  
obtained from model (1) as described in the text. 
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Figure 1:  Responses to One-Standard Deviation Structural Shocks  























NOTES: Estimates based on restricted VAR(24) system described in text The confidence intervals were constructed using a recursive-design wild 
bootstrap (see Gonçalves and Kilian 2004).   29








Cumulative Effect of Oil Supply Shock on Real Price of Oil








Cumulative Effect of Aggregate Demand Shock on Real Price of Oil








Cumulative Effect of Oil-Specific Demand Shock on Real Price of Oil























NOTES: See Figure 1.   30















Figure 3:  Annual Averages of the Shocks that Determine the Real Price of Oil 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4:  Dynamic Responses of External Accounts as a Share of GDP 
Oil Exporters 
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6:  Dynamic Responses of External Accounts as a Share of GDP 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Dynamic Responses of External Accounts as a Share of GDP 
Japan 
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Figure 14: Historical Decompositions of the Current Account as a Share of GDP 
 